Πως βρίσκουν τα χημικά όπλα που χρησιμοποιούν οι Τούρκοι εναντίον των Κούρδων-Το Μυστικό Πρόγραμμα Βιοχημικών Όπλων με κωδικό «Κιτρική Βροχή»

Το εμπιστευτικό έγγραφο-διαταγή της Τουρκικής Διοίκησης Χερσαίων Δυνάμεων υπογεγραμμένη από τον Υποστράτηγο Νεσντέτ Οζτορούν (Maj.-Gen. Necdet Öztorun), που εξουσιοδοτεί χρήση χημικών όπλων σε εχθροπραξίες με το PKK.
 
Από: infognomonpolitics.blogspot.com - Ομηρος Φωτιάδης
 
Στα τέλη Οκτωβρίου του 2006, κυκλοφόρησε στης ΗΠΑ το περιοδικό «Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy» (D&FA Strategic Policy), το οποίο πρωτοκυκλοφόρησε το 1972, και από το 1982 εκδίδεται από το μη κερδοσκοπικό ίδρυμα «The International Strategic Studies Organization» (ISSA) με έδρα την Washington DC. Το περιοδικό αυτό διακινείται μόνο με συνδρομές και συνήθως περιλαμβάνει επιλεγμένα άρθρα από πληροφορίες και αναλύσεις που δημοσιεύονται καθημερινά στην συνδρομητική ιστοσελίδα του Global Information System (GIS).
 
Το τεύχος του Οκτωβρίου 2006 της μηνιαίας επιθεώρησης D&FA Strategic Policy, περιείχε άρθρο το οποίο συνέταξε ομάδα Αμερικανών ερευνητών, με τον τίτλο «Τουρκία και PKK: Ετοιμασίες για τη Σύγκρουση» και περιελάμβανε στοιχεία για την χρήση απαγορευμένων χημικών όπλων εναντίων Κούρδων ανταρτών του PKK και αποκάλυπτε δεδομένα για τα μυστικά προγράμματα παραγωγής όπλων της Τουρκίας.
Αποδίδεται παρακάτω, σε μετάφραση από την Αγγλική γλώσσα, μέρος του άρθρου με τις καταγγελίες εναντίον της Τουρκίας.
 
«Το PKK έχει ανοίξει πολλά γραφεία στις περισσότερες πόλεις του βόρειου Ιράκ, ενώ πρόσφατα άνοιξε γραφείο στην Βαγδάτη, το οποίο λειτουργεί υπό την κάλυψη ενός πολιτισμικού οργανισμού.
 
Σύμφωνα με το περιοδικό, «Η Φωνή του Κουρδιστάν», τεύχος 89, Ιούνιος 2006, Ελληνική έκδοση, Αθήνα, με εκδότη τον Κούρδο Φαρούκ Σαρϊαλτην (Faruk Sarialtin), και μέλος του PKK, οι Τουρκικές Ένοπλες Δυνάμεις πραγματοποίησαν πρόσφατα 53 στρατιωτικές επιχειρήσεις κατά του PKK, ενώ σε μία από αυτές συνεργάστηκαν με το Ιράν. Το Ιράν έχει πραγματοποιήσει οκτώ επιχειρήσεις εναντίον του PKK μόνο του.
 
Κατά τη διάρκεια αυτών των επιχειρήσεων μεταξύ του Τουρκικού Στρατού και του PKK, 73 μάχες πραγματοποιήθηκαν• 25 στην περιοχή Μποτάν (Botan), 15 στο Αμέντ (Amed), πέντε στο Ντερσίμ (Dersim) και σε άλλες περιοχές. Το PKK ανταπέδωσε με 69 επιχειρήσεις. Κατά τη διάρκεια των συγκρούσεων ο Τουρκικός Στρατός είχε 165 απώλειες, μεταξύ των οποίων 144 ήταν στρατιώτες, επτά Αξιωματικοί και ένας Αντισυνταγματάρχης. Επίσης, 36 Ιρανοί στρατιώτες και 43 αντάρτες του PKK σκοτώθηκαν.
 
Σύμφωνα με ασφαλείς πληροφορίες, το επιχειρησιακό κέντρο των Τουρκικών Δυνάμεων για την εισβολή τους στο Νότιο Κουρδιστάν (Βόρειο Ιράκ) κατασκευάστηκε στην οροσειρά του Γκαμπάρ (Gabar) στην επαρχία Σιρνάκ (Şırnak). Οι κατασκευές έγιναν με μεγάλη ταχύτητα και δύο σταθμοί διοικήσεως έχουνε τοποθετηθεί σε στρατιωτικά κοντέϊνερς. Ο Τούρκος Στρατηγός Εργκούν Σαϊγκούν (Ergun Saigun), επισκέπτεται συχνά το στρατόπεδο και είναι ο Επιχειρησιακός Επιτελάρχης. Είχε μάλιστα και την υποστήριξη του (τότε) Διοικητή των Τουρκικών Χερσαίων Δυνάμεων, Στρατηγού Μεχμέτ Γιασάρ Μπουγιουκανίτ (Gen. Mehmet Yaşar Büyükanıt), ο οποίος και διευθύνει απευθείας τις επιχειρήσεις. [Ο Στρατηγός Μπουγιουκανίτ είναι πλέον Αρχηγός του Τουρκικού Γενικού Επιτελείου]. Η απόφαση για τη δημιουργία αυτής της διοίκησης πάρθηκε στις 25 Φεβρουαρίου 2006 κατά τη συνεδρία του Τουρκικού Συμβουλίου Εθνικής Ασφαλείας (MGK: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu). Στις 28 Μαρτίου 2006, ο Τούρκος Πρωθυπουργός Ρασέπ Ταγίπ Ερντογκάν (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) είχε μυστική συνάντηση με τον Στρατηγό Μπουγιουκανίτ, όπου και αποφάσισαν την στρατηγική του ολοκληρωτικού πολέμου κατά του PKK. Την ίδια ημέρα ο Ερντογκάν συμμετείχε σε στρατιωτική άσκηση στην πόλη, Καρς (Kars) στη νοτιοανατολική Τουρκία, φορώντας στρατιωτική στολή με σκοπό την ενθάρρυνση των στρατιωτών.
 
Στις 28 Μαρτίου 2006, οι Τουρκικές Δυνάμεις σκότωσαν 14 αντάρτες του PKK χρησιμοποιώντας χημικά όπλα, στην περιοχή Σονγκαϊλα (Songaila) στην επαρχία Μούς (Muş) της ανατολικής Τουρκίας. Το περιστατικό επιβεβαιώθηκε από το Κουρδικό περιοδικό «Η Φωνή του Κουρδιστάν», το οποίο και κατέδειξε τους 14 μαχητές του PKK που πιστεύετε ότι σκοτώθηκαν με χημικά όπλα, στις 28 Μαρτίου 2006.
 
Το γεγονός ότι οι Τουρκικές Δυνάμεις Ασφαλείας χρησιμοποιούν χημικά όπλα, παραβιάζοντας διεθνείς συνθήκες (όπως τη Συνθήκη Χημικών όπλων - Τhe Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] – την οποία η Τουρκία επικύρωσε στις 12 Μαΐου 1997), εντείνει την κρίση με τους Κούρδους του PKK.
 
Είναι σημαντικό να σημειώσουμε ότι η Τουρκία δεν είναι μέλος της «Αυστραλιανής Ομάδας». Η Αυστραλιανή Ομάδα δημιουργήθηκε το 1984 από την Αυστραλία και είναι μια ανεπίσημη και εθελοντική κοινοπραξία (22 στο σύνολο). Δεν υπάρχει καταστατικός χάρτης γιατί η ομάδα δουλεύει συναινετικά. Η ίδρυση της ήταν αποτέλεσμα της χρήσης χημικών όπλων στον πόλεμο Ιράκ-Ιράν. Σκοπός της ομάδας είναι ο περιορισμός της διάδοσης χημικών και βιολογικών όπλων. Ετήσιες συναντήσεις των μελών πραγματοποιούνται, όπου και μοιράζονται πληροφορίες για τους κινδύνους της διάδοσης χημικών και βιολογικών όπλων, καθώς επίσης φροντίζουν για τον εθνικό έλεγχο εξαγωγών σε μια προσπάθεια να σταματήσουν την μεταφορά υλικών που μπορούν να χρησιμοποιηθούν για την κατασκευή χημικών ή/και βιολογικών όπλων. Η ομάδα έχει δημιουργήσει λίστες για τα υλικά των οποίων η εξαγωγή πρέπει να ελέγχετε, καθώς επίσης και «προειδοποιητικές» λίστες με υλικά, η αγορά των οποίων αποτελεί ένδειξη δραστηριοτήτων διάδοσης χημικών και βιολογικών όπλων.
 
Από το 1993 η Αυστραλιανή Ομάδα έχει εκδώσει πληροφορίες ότι η Τουρκία παράγει δύο βιολογικές ουσίες και άλλες δύο ουσίες για την παραγωγή βιοχημικών όπλων. Απόδειξη των παραπάνω αποτελεί το μυστικό πρόγραμμα του Τουρκικού Γενικού Επιτελείου, στο οποίο και αναφέρεται ότι «Η Τουρκία πρέπει να αποκτήσει λόγω απειλών που δέχεται από γειτονικά κράτη, πολλαπλασιαστές δύναμης, οι οποίοι επιτρέπουν την εγκατάσταση πυρηνικών, βιολογικών και χημικών όπλων σε πυραύλους».
 
Νωρίτερα, στις 25 Φεβρουαρίου 1986, το Τουρκικό Γενικό Επιτελείο είχε διατάξει με εμπιστευτική οδηγία υπογεγραμμένη από τον Υποστράτηγο Νεσντέτ Οζτοράν (Maj.-Gen. Necdet Öztorun), διοικητή του Τουρκικού Στρατού από το 1987, την χρήση χημικών όπλων σε εχθροπραξίες με το PKK.
 
Στις 23 Ιουλίου 1989, η Τουρκική εφημερίδα «Ikibine Dorga», αποκάλυψε την ύπαρξη μυστικής οδηγίας ασφαλείας για την χρήση χημικών και βιολογικών όπλων κατά των Κούρδων μαχητών. Ο Κούρδος καθηγητής Σελαντέτ Τσελικέρ (Celadet Celiker) είχε συγκεντρώσει πληροφορίες για την παραγωγή χημικών και βιολογικών όπλων σε μυστικά εργαστήρια του Τουρκικού Στρατού. Το 1992, ο Κούρδος καθηγητής παρέδωσε τις πληροφορίες που είχε σε Ευρωπαϊκή χώρα, η οποία προσθέτοντας και τις δικές της πληροφορίες, παρέδωσε το σύνολο αυτών μετά ένα χρόνο στην Αυστραλιανή Ομάδα. Αργότερα, ο Καθηγητής Τσελικέρ έγινε στόχος παραστρατιωτικών δυνάμεων της Τουρκικής Μυστικής Υπηρεσίας MIT (MIT: Turkish National Intelligence Organization), με προσπάθειες κατά της ζωής του. Ο Καθηγητής απέδρασε στην Ευρώπη, ενώ πρόσφατα εγκαταστάθηκε στο Βόρειο Ιράκ.
 
Ο Υποστράτηγος Νεσντέτ Οζτοράν ήτανε για κάποιο διάστημα ο διοικητής του μυστικού βιοχημικού προγράμματος της Τουρκίας. Μετά την αποστράτευση του δίδαξε στο Πανεπιστήμιο «FMV Isik» (Feyiye Mektepleri Vakfı - Işık Üniversitesi) στην Κωνσταντινούπολη.
 
Επιβεβαιωμένες πληροφορίες για την χρήση χημικών όπλων κατά των Κούρδων ανταρτών προέκυψαν στης 11 Μάιου 1999. Η χρήση χημικών όπλων πραγματοποιήθηκε στην περιοχή Μπαλικαγια (Ballikaya) νοτιοανατολικά της πόλης Σιρνάκ (Şırnak), στην επαρχία Σιρνάκ. Οι Τουρκικές Δυνάμεις εκτόξευσαν πυρά όλμων τα οποία περιείχαν χημικές ουσίες, κατά Κούρδων του PKK. Κούρδοι μαχητές συνέλεξαν θραύσματα από τους όλμους όταν επέστρεψαν στην περιοχή και έπειτα τα παρέδωσαν για ανάλυση σε Ευρωπαϊκή χώρα. Τα θραύσματα αναλύθηκαν από το Ινστιτούτο Ιατροδικαστικής Επιστήμης του Πανεπιστημίου του Μονάχου, στη Γερμανία. Κατά την επίθεση 22 Κούρδοι μαχητές σκοτώθηκαν.
 
Στις 27 Οκτωβρίου 1999, το Γερμανικό τηλεοπτικό κανάλι ZDF, μετέδωσε στην εκπομπή «Kennzeichen D» τις πληροφορίες για τα θραύσματα και ανακοίνωσε ότι το Ινστιτούτο του Μονάχου ανίχνευσε απαγορευμένες χημικές ουσίες, οι οποίες είναι παράγωγα και συστατικά του χημικού τύπου RP707. Το κανάλι ZDF αποκάλυψε ότι οι απαγορευμένες χημικές ουσίες για στρατιωτική χρήση είχαν εξαχθεί από την Γερμανική εταιρεία Buck, στην Τουρκία από το 1995 (Πρακτορείο Ειδήσεων DDP, Βερολίνο, 26 Οκτωβρίου 1999).
 
Τα τελευταία 15 χρόνια υπήρξαν πολλές εκθέσεις αναφερόμενες στη χρήση χημικών και βιολογικών όπλων κατά των Κούρδων μαχητών, ενώ η απόδειξη αυτών είναι δύσκολο να πραγματοποιηθεί. Στις 23 Ιανουαρίου 1990 η εφημερίδα «Cyprus Mail» ανέφερε ότι από το Φεβρουάριο του 1988 ο Τουρκικός Στρατός σκότωσε 30 Κούρδους μαχητές με τη χρήση χημικών όπλων στην περιοχή Μπακοκ (Bakok). Επίσης, η εφημερίδα «Baltimore Sun» ανέφερε στις 4 Σεπτεμβρίου 1991 ότι έγινε χρήση χημικών όπλων κατά Κούρδων μαχητών τον Ιούνιο του 1991 στην περιοχή Μπινγκιολ (Bingöl), κοντά στην επαρχία Γκεντς (Genç), στην περιφέρεια του Μπινγκιόλ. Ο Σύλλογος Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων (Human Rights Association) ανέφερε στις 6 Ιουλίου 2001 τον θάνατο 20 Κούρδων αυτονομιστών από χημικά όπλα στο Ελμαλι (Elmali) στην επαρχία Γιεντισου (Yedisu), στην περιφέρεια του Μπίνγκιολ.
 
Σε κάποια παράγραφο του αποκαλυπτικού άρθρου, γινόταν αναφορά για «ανεπιβεβαίωτες πληροφορίες και φήμες» οι οποίες φέρουν τους Τούρκους να χρησιμοποίησαν ως πειραματόζωα Ελληνοκύπριους αιχμαλώτους που απήγαγαν και μετέφεραν στην Τουρκία το 1974. Οι συντάκτες του κειμένου κάνουν αναφορά ότι οι φήμες αυτές προέρχονται από τον δολοφονηθέντα στις 20 Μαρτίου 1994, Ελληνοκύπριο αγωνιστή, Θεόφιλο Γεωργιάδη.
Αποδίδεται παρακάτω, σε μετάφραση από την Αγγλική γλώσσα, μέρος του άρθρου με τις καταγγελίες εναντίον της Τουρκίας.
 
«Πολλές αναφορές, οι οποίες καταγγέλθηκαν από Κούρδους αλλά και Τούρκους, έκαναν λόγο και για τους αγνοούμενους της Κύπρου. Συγκεκριμένα, αναφέρθηκε ότι από το 1984 έως και το 1988, αγνοούμενοι Ελληνοκύπριοι και Έλληνες στρατιώτες αιχμάλωτοι της εισβολής του 1974 κατέληξαν σε μυστικά βιοχημικά εργαστήρια του Τουρκικού Στρατού και χρησιμοποιήθηκαν ως πειραματόζωα. Οι αναφορές αυτές δεν επιβεβαιώθηκαν ποτέ. Ο Ελληνοκύπριος μαχητής και φίλος προς τον Κουρδικό λαό, Θεόφιλος Γεωργιάδης, δολοφονήθηκε από την Τουρκική ΜΙΤ στις 20 Μαρτίου του 1994, στης 10:00 το πρωί, έξω από την οικία του. Ο Γεωργιάδης ήταν υπολοχαγός καταδρομέας της Κυπριακής Εθνοφρουράς. Είχε ειδίκευση σε Τουρκικά θέματα και στις πολιτικές επιστήμες με σπουδές στην Γαλλία και Γερμανία. Είχε μεταφερθεί στο Γραφείο Εθνικής Ασφάλειας της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, στο τμήμα Τουρκίας. Το 1986 υπηρέτησε στο Γραφείο Τύπου της Δημοκρατίας της Κύπρου. Στις 12 και 13 Μαρτίου 1994, σε ένα διεθνές συνέδριο που έγινε στης Βρυξέλλες, ο Γεωργιάδης αποκάλυψε πληροφορίες για τις μεθόδους που χρησιμοποίησαν οι Τούρκοι για να καταπνίξουν το Κουρδικό πρόβλημα, αλλά και τη βιαιότητα κατά των Ελληνοκύπριων αιχμαλώτων. Οι κατηγορίες του προκάλεσαν μεγάλες αντιδράσεις στην Τουρκία. Αφού επέστρεψε στην Κύπρο, ο Γεωργιάδης δολοφονήθηκε στην αυλή της οικίας του, με πυροβολισμούς από «αγνώστους». Φημολογήθηκε ότι είχε πληροφορίες για τους αγνοούμενους Ελληνοκυπρίους και ότι είχε έρθει σε επαφή με Κούρδους του PKK, οι οποίοι είχαν αποδράσει από ένα μυστικό βιοχημικό εργαστήριο του Τουρκικού Στρατού, έξω από την Άγκυρα και το οποίο λειτουργούσε υπό την επίβλεψη της Τουρκικής Στρατιωτικής Ιατρικής Ακαδημίας - Gulhane Military Medical Academy (GMMA). Αυτοί οι Κούρδοι, σύμφωνα με ανεπιβεβαίωτες πληροφορίες και φήμες, είχαν μαρτυρήσει ότι πραγματοποιήθηκαν βιοχημικά πειράματα σε Ελληνοκύπριους και Έλληνες αιχμαλώτους».
 
Η παράγραφος αυτή πυροδότησε πλήθος δημοσιευμάτων στα Κυπριακά και Ελληνικά ΜΜΕ. Εκατοντάδες δημοσιεύσεις και αναφορές για το θέμα υπήρξαν διεθνώς. Ο Τουρκικός Τύπος, στο σύνολό του, ασχολήθηκε πάρα πολύ με το περιεχόμενο του άρθρου, καλώντας το Τουρκικό Γενικό Επιτελείο Στρατού να λάβει θέση απέναντι στις καταγγελίες του Αμερικανικού περιοδικού. Παρά τις τεράστιες πιέσεις των Τούρκων δημοσιογράφων και το πλήθος των δημοσιευμάτων του Τουρκικού τύπου, ο Τουρκικός Στρατός, δεν έκανε καμία ανακοίνωση, ούτε προέβη σε καμία διάψευση των καταγγελιών εναντίων του. Η στάση αυτή του Τουρκικού Στρατού, από πολλούς ερμηνεύθηκε ως μια σιωπηρή αποδοχή των καταγγελιών και ως φόβος για πιθανή μελλοντική δημοσιοποίηση και άλλων στοιχείων εις βάρος του, τα οποία θα εκθέτανε ανεπανόρθωτα την Τουρκία, έτσι και προχωρούσε σε διάψευση των καταγγελιών του D&FA Strategic Policy.
 
Την ίδια ώρα ο εκδότης του περιοδικού D&FA Strategic Policy, κ. Κόπλεϊ (Mr. Gregory Copley), στις 24 Οκτωβρίου 2006, σε συνέντευξη του στον δημοσιογράφο Λάμπρο Παπαντωνίου που δημοσιεύθηκε στον «Ελεύθερο Τύπο», με τίτλο «Τούρκοι μας έδωσαν τις πληροφορίες», δηλώνει ότι οι πληροφορίες αυτές «προέρχονται από ανθρώπινες πηγές, σχετιζόμενες με υπηρεσίες πληροφοριών που βρίσκονται μέσα στην Τουρκία, (it's coming from human intelligente sources inside Turkey!) », δημιουργώντας μεγάλο σοκ στους Τούρκους, οι οποίοι και πάλι τηρούν σιγή ιχθύος!
 
Στην Κύπρο το θέμα είχε λάβει τεράστιες διαστάσεις και έτυχε ανάλογης πολιτικής εκμετάλλευσης από κύκλους οι οποίοι αντιπολιτεύονται τον Κύπριο Πρόεδρο Τάσο Παπαδόπουλο, κάνοντας μάλιστα και σχόλια ότι ο εκδότης του D&FA Strategic Policy, είναι «πράκτορας» του Κύπριου Προέδρου και «πληρώθηκε» για το δημοσίευμα. Οι χαρακτηρισμοί αυτοί προκάλεσαν πλήθος αντιδράσεων, καθώς οι επικριτές του Κυπρίου Προέδρου, φέρονται μεταξύ αυτών που υποστήριζαν το ΝΑΙ στο Σχέδιο «Ανάν».
Το αξιοπερίεργο στην όλη υπόθεση, είναι ότι το άρθρο αυτό στο σύνολό του, αναφέρεται στην διαμάχη μεταξύ Τούρκων και Κούρδων. Η αναφορά στους Ελληνοκυπρίους αιχμαλώτους, είναι πολύ μικρή και μάλιστα παραπέμπει σε «ανεπιβεβαίωτες φήμες και πληροφορίες». Γιατί άραγε να προκλήθηκε τόσος σάλος;
Στις 5 Νοεμβρίου 2006, η εφημερίδα «Το Παρόν», στην σελίδα 24, δημοσιεύει ολοσέλιδό άρθρο με τον τίτλο «Απολογητές και Συνήγοροι της Άγκυρας στον Ελληνικό Τύπο», κάνοντας λόγο για προσπάθεια απαξίωσης του εκδότη του περιοδικού D&FA Strategic Policy, από Έλληνες και Κύπριους δημοσιογράφους, με σκοπό την υπεράσπιση της Άγκυρα κλπ.
 
Οι θιασώτες της «Ελληνοτουρκικής φιλίας» τρομοκρατήθηκαν στο ενδεχόμενο «Ελληνικής εμπλοκής» στις καταγγελίες εναντίων της Τουρκίας, μιας και πλησίαζε ο Δεκέμβριος του 2006, και η Τουρκία θα κρινόταν εάν θα λάμβανε εντολή ή όχι, για την έναρξη των ενταξιακών διαπραγματεύσεων με την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (ΕΕ).
Οι καταγγελίες αυτές πιθανόν, να κλόνιζαν τις θετικές προοπτικές για την Τουρκία και το αίτημά της για είσοδο στην ΕΕ. Αίτημα το οποίο με κάθε μέσο και τρόπο υποστηρίζει η Ελλάδα στους διεθνείς φορείς και οργανισμούς. Οι πολιτικές αντιπαραθέσεις, οι δημοσιογραφικές διαμάχες και αντεγκλήσεις για τις «ανεπιβεβαίωτες φήμες» πήραν τεράστιες διαστάσεις και ουδείς ασχολήθηκε με τις σοβαρές καταγγελίες του άρθρου για τη χρήση χημικών όπλων εναντίων των Κούρδων!
Η Τουρκία σιώπησε εντελώς, αφήνοντας τις Ελληνικές εμπάθειες, να την υπερασπίσουν και να αποπροσανατολίσουν το κοινό, από το να ασχοληθεί με τις σοβαρές καταγγελίες, τις οποίες δεν τόλμησε μέχρι σήμερα να διαψεύσει.
Δύο αναφορές για το θέμα πέρασαν απαρατήρητες και θα ήταν πολύ χρήσιμο να αναφερθούν, καθώς προκαλούν έντονο προβληματισμό και ερωτηματικά...
 
1. Σε συνέντευξη Τύπου του Κυβερνητικού Εκπροσώπου της Κύπρου, κ. Χ. Πασιαρδή στις 23 Οκτωβρίου 2006, ο Κύπριος δημοσιογράφος κ. Πομηλορίδης, χαρακτηριστικά ρώτησε τον κ. Πασιαρδή «Οι πληροφορίες είναι ότι ο αείμνηστος Θεόφιλος Γεωργιάδης είχε ενημερώσει την Κυβέρνηση, τότε. Δηλαδή μιλάμε ότι υπήρχαν αγνοούμενοι ζωντανοί οι οποίοι υποβάλλονταν σε τέτοιου είδους πειράματα. Αυτό δήλωσε και ο πατέρας του Θεόφιλου Γεωργιάδη, ο οποίος γνώριζε τις κινήσεις του γιου του». Οι «ανεπιβεβαίωτες φήμες» του D&FA Strategic Policy, μήπως επιβεβαιώνονται;
[Η συνέντευξη είναι διαθέσιμη στην ιστοσελίδα του Γραφείου Τύπου και Πληροφοριών της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, "Συνάντηση του Υφυπουργού παρά τω Προέδρω και Κυβερνητικού Εκπροσώπου κ. Χριστόδουλου Πασιαρδή με τους δημοσιογράφους", 23/10/2006, URL: http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/3BBFF62A74EE87F3C2257210003EFA2F?OpenDocument]
 
2. Στην πρωινή εκπομπή του Κυπρίου δημοσιογράφου Λάζαρου Μαύρου, στο «Ράδιο Πρώτο» στις 25 Οκτωβρίου 2006, φιλοξενούμενος ήταν ο κ. Μητσόπουλος, Βουλευτής του ΔΗΣΥ. Ο κ. Μητσόπουλος διετέλεσε σύμβουλος στο Ελληνικό Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών για τα θέματα της Κύπρου την δεκαετία του '80. Μεταξύ άλλων ο Κύπριος Βουλευτής ανέφερε: «Οι μόνοι που γνώριζαν για αυτές τις πληροφορίες και είχαν αποδείξεις και στοιχεία ήταν ο Θεόφιλος Γεωργιάδης και ο Πρόεδρος του Συνδέσμου Συγγενών Αγνοούμενων Ελλαδιτών. Το Τέλος του Θεόφιλου το γνωρίζουμε. Εκείνο που με ξάφνιασε ήταν η πληροφορία ότι τον Πρόεδρο του Συνδέσμου Ελλαδιτών, τον δολοφόνησαν και ο θάνατός του δεν εξιχνιάστηκε ποτέ. Αυτός διατηρούσε αρχείο με στοιχεία στο γραφείο του. Το ίδιο βράδυ της δολοφονίας του, το γραφείο του παραβιάστηκε και εξαφανίστηκαν όλα τα έγγραφα»!!! [Τα σχόλια είναι διαθέσιμα στην ιστοσελίδα: http://www.skorpialogia.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=193&Itemid=2] Τόσο σοβαρές αποκαλύψεις από έναν Βουλευτή και τέως σύμβουλο του Ελληνικού Υπ. Εξωτερικών, προκαλούν δικαίως πλήθος ερωτηματικά... όχι για τις καταγγελίες, αλλά για τους δημοσιογράφους-επικριτές και υποστηρικτές της Άγκυρας και τα κίνητρά τους!
 
Για την ιστορία, όταν «συνελήφθη» (παραδόθηκε από εμάς χάρη της Ελληνοτουρκικής φιλίας) ο Αμπντουλάχ Οτσαλάν (Abdullah Öcalan), έφερε Κυπριακό διαβατήριο με το όνομα, Λάζαρος Μαύρος.
 
«Πράκτορας» του Τ. Παπαδόπουλου, λοιπόν ο εκδότης του Αμερικανικού περιοδικού D&FA Strategic Policy! Εμείς προσθέτουμε και των Κούρδων!!!
Πληρωμένοι πράκτορες, είναι όσοι καταγγέλλουν την Τουρκία, για τους θιασώτες της Ελληνοτουρκικής φιλίας, του Σχεδίου «Ανάν» και του αγώνα της ανεξαρτησίας των Κούρδων!
 
Στα παραπάνω ήρθαν να προστεθούν και δημοσιεύματα, ότι κατά το δικαστήριο του Σαντάμ Χουσεΐν (Saddam Hussein) και των συνεργατών του, για το θάνατο 182 χιλιάδων Κούρδων το 1987 και 1988 με χημικά όπλα, παρουσιάστηκαν πλήθος στοιχεία και δεκάδες φάκελοι του Ιρακινού Στρατού, όπου αναφέρουν πλήρη εμπλοκή της Τουρκίας στην αποστολή χημικών όπλων και ουσιών, προς τον Σ. Χουσεΐν, για την εξόντωση των χιλιάδων αθώων Κούρδων χωρικών!
 
[Περισσότερες πληροφορίες διαθέσιμες στα άρθρα: Kurdish info," Secret evidence at Saddam trial", 21/12/2006, URL: http://www.kurdishinfo.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=5298, και KurdishMedia, "Saddam directly involved in gas attack, prosecutor says", 19/12/2006, URL: http://www.kurdmedia.com/printarticles.asp?id=13772]
Πρόσφατα είδαν και πάλι το φως της δημοσιότητας πληροφορίες για το πυρηνικό πρόγραμμα της Τουρκίας. Εάν σε αυτές προσθέσουμε και τις καταγγελίες του D&FA Strategic Policy, σαν Έλληνες και γείτονες της Τουρκίας θα πρέπει να ανησυχούμε σοβαρά για το μέλλον μας.

Το άρθρο δημοσιεύθηκε στο περιοδικό "διπλωματία" το έτος 2007

Ακολουθεί το άρθρο που δημοσιεύθηκε στο αμερικανικό περιοδικό

Founded in 1972. Formerly Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily.


Volume XXIV, No. 51      Wednesday, August 30, 2006





Background Report
Turkey and the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK): Preparations for the Confrontation
Analysis. By GIS South-East Europe Station. The Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK: Kurdistan Workers’ Party) has founded many offices in most cities of northern Iraq, while they have recently opened an office in Baghdad, operating there under the cover of a cultural organization.
According to the magazine, The Voice of Kurdistan, issue number 89, of June 2006, which is written in Greek and printed in Athens-Greece by a Kurd, Faruk Sarialtin, a member of PKK, the Turkish Armed Forces had recently conducted 53 military operations against the PKK plus one in cooperation with Iran. Iran itself had conducted eight separate operations against PKK.
During these operations, 25 held in Botan, 15 in Amed, five in Dersim and other areas, between the Turkish Army and PKK, 73 battles realized. PKK responded with 69 reprisal operations. During the combat the Turkish army had 165 casualties, among them 144 soldiers, seven army officers, and one lieutenant colonel. Also, 36 Iranian soldiers and 43 PKK rebels were killed.
According to a secure source, the operations command camp for the Turkish forces to invade into southern Kurdistan (northern Iraq) was constructed in the mountain range area of Gabar in the Şırnak Province. The constructions are been held speediness and two company commands have been stationed in military containers. Turkish General Ergun Saigun frequently visits the camp and he is the operation’s Chief of Staff. He has been accompanied by Gen. Mehmet Yaşar Büyükanıt,1 the (then) commander of the Turkish Land Forces, who also directly commanded the operations. [Gen. Büyükanıt was recently promoted to Chief of the General Staff.] The decision for the foundation of this command was taken on February 25, 2006, during the meeting of the Turkish National Security Council2 (Turkish NSC, in Turkish: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu-MGK). On March 28, 2006, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met in secret with Gen. Büyükanıt and decided on the strategy of total war against PKK. On the same date, PM Erdoğan participated on a military exercise in the city of Kars (northeast Turkey) and he was dressed with military uniform (field dress) in order to encourage the soldiers.
On the same date, March 28, 2006, Turkish forces killed 14 PKK rebels using chemical weapons in the Songaila area in the Muş3 province (eastern Turkey). The event was confirmed by the Kurdish magazine, The Voice of Kurdistan,4 which showed 14 PKK fighters who were believed to have been killed by chemical weapons on March 28, 2006.
The fact that the Turkish Security Forces reportedly used chemical weapons, violating international conventions (ie: the Chemical Weapons Convention5 [CWC]), altered the crisis with the Kurds of the PKK.
Turkey is not a member of the “Australia Group”.6 The Australia Group was formed in 1984 by Australia and is an informal and voluntary consortium of nations (22 in number); with no formal charter or constitution; the Australia Group works by consensus. It was founded as a result of chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq War. Its goal is the limitation of chemical and biological weapons proliferation. Members meet annually to share information about proliferation dangers and to harmonize national export controls in an effort to curb the transfer of materials or equipment that could be used in the creation of chemical or biological weapons. The group has created lists of both items whose export should be controlled, as well as “warning” lists of items whose purchase could be indicative of proliferation activities.
Since 1993, the Australian Group has produced information that Turkey produces two biological agents and two additional agents for the production of biochemical weapons. A confidential program of the Turkish General Staff (Genelkurmay Başkanları - TAF) reports that “Turkey must acquire, due to threats from neighbor countries, Force multipliers, that allow the installation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons into missiles”.
In an earlier confidential directive of the Turkish General Staff signed by Maj.-Gen. Necdet Öztorun, commander of the Turkish Army as of late 1987, orders and directions were given for the use of chemical weapons during confrontations with PKK. The directive was dated February 25, 1986.
On July 23, 1989, the Turkish newspaper, Ikibine Dorga, revealed the existence of a secret security directive for the use of chemical and biological weapons against Kurdish fighters. Kurdish medical professor Celadet Celiker had harvested information for the production of chemical and biological weapons in secret laboratories of the Turkish Army. In 1992, the Kurdish professor provided the information he had to a European country; the latter added its own information and one year later gave the information to the Australian Group. Later, Prof. Celiker became the target of the paramilitary forces of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı - MİT) which made several attempts on his life. Prof. Celiker escaped to Europe and was recently stationed to northern Iraq. 
Maj.-Gen. Necdet Öztorun was, for a while, the commander/foremost of the secret biochemical weapons program of Turkey. After his retirement, Öztorun began teaching in the FMV Isik University (Feyiye Mektepleri Vakfı - Işık Üniversitesi).7
Confirmed use of chemical weapons against Kurdish rebels occurred on May 11, 1999, in the area of Ballikaya south-east of Şırnak town in Şırnak Province. The Turkish forces fired mortar rounds which contained chemical substances against PKK Kurds. Shrapnel from the mortar rounds were collected by Kurdish fighters who returned later to the area and these were delivered for analysis to a European country. The shrapnel were analyzed by the Institute of Forensic Medicine at the University of Munich, Germany.  
On October 27, 1999, the German TV channel ZDF, in its TV show “Kennzeichen D”, broadcast the information and reported that the Munich Institute identified forbidden chemical substances, which were derivatives and compounds of the chemical type RP707. ZDF revealed that this forbidden chemical substance for military use was exported by the German company, Buck, to Turkey from 1995 onwards (DDP news agency, Berlin, October 26, 1999). Twenty Kurdish fighters were killed during this assault.
In the past 15 years, there were many reports of the use of chemical and biological weapons against Kurdish fighters; however these have been difficult to verify. On January 23, 1990, the newspaper, The Cyprus Mail, reported that the Turkish Army in February 1988, in the area of Bakok, killed 30 Kurdish fighters with chemical weapons. Also, The Baltimore Sun newspaper reported on September 4, 1991, that chemical weapons were used against Kurds in June 1991 in the area of Bingöl near Genç district of the Bingöl Province. The Human Rights Association referred on July 6, 2001, to the death of 20 separatist Kurds from chemical weapons in the area of Elmali in the Yedisu district of Bingöl Province.
There were many references — denounced mostly by Kurds but also Turks — that during 1984-1988 many missing Greek-Cypriots and Greek soldiers captured during the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974 ended in the secret biochemical laboratories of the Turkish army and were used as guinea pigs. However, such references have not been confirmed or verified. The Kurdish-friendly Greek-Cypriot fighter, Theophilos Georgiadis, was assassinated by the Turkish MİT on March 20, 1994, at 10:00 hrs outside his house. Georgiadis was lieutenant in the rangers of the Cypriot National Guard. He specialized in Turkic issues and political science with studies made in France and Germany. He was transferred to the Cypriot National Security office, in the department focusing on Turkey. In 1986 he served in the Press and Information office (PIO) of the Republic of Cyprus. On March 12 and 13, 1994, on an international conference held in Brussels, Georgiadis revealed data on Turkey’s methods for the suppression of the Kurdish problem and the brutishness against Greek-Cypriots missing people. His accusations brought a substantial reaction in Turkey. After he returned to Cyprus, he was killed in the yard of his house from gun shots by “unknown” people. It was rumored that he had information for the missing Greek-Cypriots and he was in contact with PKK Kurds who had managed to escape from a secret biochemical laboratory of the Turkish Army outside of Ankara and which operated under the supervision of the Gulhane Military Medical Academy (GMMA).8 These Kurds had witnessed the conduct of biochemical experiments into Greeks and Greek-Cypriot captives.
At the same time and according to the Greek Cypriot newspaper, Politis, in August 2006, the Under Sec. to the Cypriot President, Mr  Christodoulos Pasiardis, expressed his regrets because the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, repeated on an interview in the Turkish media that Greek Cypriots supported the PKK. Specifically, Mr Talat alleged that he presented to the Greek Cypriots evidence through the United Nations (UN) to support his arguments. However, Under-Sec. Pasiardis said that the UN never delivered such evidence to the Greek Cypriot Government and had falsified Talats’ arguments on the support of the Greek-Cypriots for the PKK.
The well-known member of the PKK and member of the Executive Council of the Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (Koma Komalên Kurdistan – KKK), Cemil Bayik, stated in an interview in The Voice of Kurdistan, issue number 89, of June 2006, the following (free translation from Greek): “Last February (2006), a cooperation agreement was signed between Iran and Turkey. The agreement includes mainly PKK, but in substance it contains the Kurdish independence movement.” In the same magazine, Bahoz Erdal, commander of the People’s Defense Forces (HPG) of PKK, stated regarding the possible invasion of the Turkish Army in northern Iraq that “we are prepared to confront the military forces of Turkey along the borders of southern Kurdistan (northern Iraq) and Turkey will experience a Waterloo”. “From a military point of view even though Turkey conducts big scale operations against our forces in northern Kurdistan (south-east Turkey) they don’t reach the desired level of results. In southern Kurdistan (northern Iraq) that we are better organized and we have good infrastructure and our rebel forces are deep and width, not only [Turkey] will see no results but they will meet debacle”.
Erdal also stressed that “it is not fortuitous event that Iran conducts operations against rebels using tens of thousands of soldiers and at the same time the Turkish state accumulates tens of thousands of soldiers in the area”.
In 2004, a party was founded in Iran called “PEJAK” (the Party for a Free Life in Iranian Kurdistan). PEJAK is a subdivision of PKK in Iran. The director of PEJAK is Haji Ahmadi and he is self-exiled in Europe. A few days before he returned to the mountains of Kurdistan he stated in an interview in the Greek newspaper, Eleftherotypia, (June 25, 2006) the following:
Q – Do you conduct common operations with PKK fighters?
A – We are brother parties, one nation sharing the same massif. We support each other.
Q – Does Abdullah Öcalan influence your struggle?
A – I would say that he designates/defines our struggle.
Q – The US characterized PKK a terrorist organization. Why?
A - We wonder the same thing. When did PKK sink a ship or conducted an air piracy? When PKK did killed women, children or US soldiers?
Q- Does PKK operated without their [US] acquiescence from Iraqi soil?
A – It is probable the US not to be able to attack PKK because it is a big force in the area.
Q – What will happen in Iran?
A – The US is difficult to achieve what they want without us. We are a ‘force’ the US cannot ignore.
The Washington Times on April 3, 2006, in an article by James Brandon, complimented the “secular character” and “western oriented” approach of PEJAK. On April 15, 2006, The Economist alleged, according to strong Iranian and Turkish sources, that the organization had been supplied by the US. While The Washington Times reporter visited PEJAK bases, he said that he did not note any “US presence in money or weapons”. Due to The Economist article, US Congressman Dennis J. Kucinich (OH), sent a letter to US Pres. George W. Bush, requesting information regarding the US forces in Iraq links with PEJAK activities.
Haji Ahmadi also discussed on the operations of his organization in “Eastern Kurdistan”. Cemil Bayik of PKK referred to the operations of the organization in “southern Kurdistan” and “northern Kurdistan”. While Syrian Kurds friendly to PKK refer to “western Kurdistan”. Hence, it was concluded that PKK had been dispersed rapidly and increased its forces speedily in Iran and Syria also. The armed operations appeared to have shown exponential growth, while their operations in south-eastern Turkey were characterized more dynamic despite the presence of 265,000 Turkish troops in the area.
Further, PKK operations have reported increases in Europe where hundreds of offices exist in almost every European country. The PKK has been questioning the stance of the US and why the US characterized them as “terrorists”. Specifically, one member of PKK in Germany stated that the “PKK is an armed autonomous movement. They are not a terrorist organization in any case. The US is aware that the Kurdish brothers in Iran and Syria live under miserable and oppressive regime. In Turkey the millions of Kurds live under pursuit and grand repression. There is no other way rather than armed resistance. Our [alternative] attempts have been exhausted during decades. Millions of Kurds live in abjection and they do not receive even the essential human rights”. While keeping his anonymity, the PKK member added: “The events that took place on November 9, 2005, in Şemdinli with the bomb explosion in the book store ‘Vmut’, Gen. Mehmet Yaşar Büyükanıt statements on the case, the use of chemical weapons on March ’06 in Muş, point to who the terrorist is. Turkey!” And he stressed: “The Albanians in Kosovo win their independence. Their armed struggle against dictator Milošević is been vindicated! Our autonomist struggle, of the quintuple Kurds and more is been characterized terrorist! The West should understand that PKK defenses against the daily attacks simple Kurds receive in south-east Turkey. Thousand of villages have been flattening! Thousands refugees! We defend our lives and the future of [a] million children”.
The 265,000-strong Turkish Army force which is spread along the borders of Iraq and Turkey seems to have dealt with its organization problems and they have not managed to successfully strike against the autonomist rebels of PKK in SE Turkey.
Many commandos units of the Turkish Army have supplied their men with protection masks for biochemical war. The protection masks are part of their personal kit. Many military exercises are been held where the Turkish soldiers wear these protection masks.
Secure information has revealed in August 2006, that the Turkish General Staff (TAF) was preparing for the invasion of northern Iraq at the beginning of September 2006, using 80,000 troops. The operations would, the sources said, be conducted through four entrance points by land and air and in full cooperation with Iran. Iran from the mid- August was to attack PEJAK and PKK in order to force them towards northern Iraq. Afterwards they would “seal” the borders with Turkey and N. Iraq giving the chance to Turkey to strike them into their bases. Until then Turkish forces will clean up the autonomists of PKK in SE Turkey, while the latter will try to move into their bases in N. Iraq.
There was some question as to whether the August 2006, Iranian operations were being conducted under the cover of the supposed training exercise, codenamed “The Blow of Zolfaghar”. 
It was expected that the Turkish forces would make use of the heavy firepower available to it to finally annihilate PKK and destroy there bases and infrastructure in N. Iraq; creating a “security belt” of six km (3.7 miles) inside the borders of N. Iraq.
Turkish officials were expecting the advancements in Lebanon in order to follow the same tactics. However, the two cases have big differences. The forces of HizbAllah are different from those of the PKK. 
It was believed that the Kurdish forces in N. Iraq would assist the PKK if Turkey invaded the area in a conventional sense. The mountainous and gnarled land of N. Iraq favors unorthodox warfare. Big military formations cannot move. PKK bases number in the hundreds in the area, and are located in caves and inapproachable gorges. The Turkish forces must use helicopters. Operationally, it must be taken for granted that the Turks would not be able to take by assault the Kurdish fighters who have moved into positions and have “captured” all passages and strategic points. PKK and other Kurdish forces, by late August 2006, were well-prepared to confront the Turkish forces. PKK has already organized independent administration units, with great autonomy of logistical support and activation. In the case of invasion, a central operations command would not exist. Each division had a specific mission which it understood perfectly. Historically, the PKK has proven that it understands unorthodox war better than the Turks. At the same time, Turkey will have to confront a resultant threat domestically and in urban areas within Turkey.
From previous Turkish operations in N. Iraq and from recent ones, it has been proven that conventional means and the weaponry systems which the Turkish Army had used were not effective against PKK fighters who have excelled in the use of the difficult terrain.
Information points to the fact that the Turkish Army may be determined to use biochemical weapons in N. Iraq against the PKK because other means would be insufficient, particularly against PKK strongholds in caves.
The political and military leadership in Turkey have reportedly agreed on their actions against PKK, brushing aside there problems. They are testing US endurance related to invading to N. Iraq which had been clearly forbidden by the US. The US need the Kurds in northern Iraq more than ever due to the unstable situation in the internal affairs in Iraq. The developments in Middle East, in Iran and Syria, cannot preclude the participation of PKK from the US plans because they are the only ones that have forceful organized cells and armed units of high warrior values in these countries, particularly as the US considers means to contain Iran from strategic warfare against Israel.
The following is a listing of some of the key engagements between the Turkish and PKK forces from April to August 2006:
  • From April 20, 2006, to May 10, 2006, the Turkish Army undertook many rebel operations in southeast Turkey. Also, in cooperation with Iran they conducted Iranian-Turkish operations in northern Iraq (southern Kurdistan).
  • The first invasion of Iran was conducted on April 21, 2006, in the Iraqi town of Haj Omran, about 180 miles northeast of Baghdad, reaching five km (3.1 miles) into Iraqi territory before the withdrew. The Iranian forces confronted the PEJAK Kurds. On the same date, the Iranian artillery bombarded many Kurdish villages. The small city Lulan received 180 shells.
  • On May 1, 2006, the Iranians lost 14 soldiers while falling into a PKK ambush. By way of retaliation, Iranian artillery bombarded 10 villages in the province of Kalaa Dazaa, 160 km (100 miles) north of al-Sulaimaniya near the Iranian border. Intense bombarded was also noticed in the villages of Razka, Jukhanki and Samawa. At the same time the Turkish Army was conducting Operation Half Moon, using 200,000 soldiers in south-east Turkey and northern Iraq.
  • Intense battles were conducted in the Mount Kadil between the Turkish Special Forces and PKK rebels, with the participation of AH-1 Cobra and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. Iranian Special Forces were transferred by CH-47 Chinook helicopters in the north of M. Kadil where they fought with PKK and PEJAK fighters. Iranian forces suffered significant losses.
  • On April ,4, 2006, night operation commandos was conducted by 120 men of “Bordo Bereli”, the special unit for Special War operations of the Turkish Special Forces, in the area of Cakarca reaching 19 km (12 miles) from the Turkish-Iraqi borders.
  • The following days Turkish offensive helicopters and the artillery attacked the small Kurdish cities Amedi and Zaho. Intense bombarding and attacks followed in the areas of Geliye, Pirbela, Sesdara, Seranis and Elanis. However, the results brought by the Turkish-Iranian operations were not significant. Thought, they did cause a wave of refugees as they did not separate military and political targets.
  • Despite the presence of 265,000 Turkish soldiers and police forces in south-east Turkey, PKK Kurds conducted many retaliation operations during the same period. From May 13 to May 15, 2006, four Turkish soldiers were killed in the Şırnak Province, in south-eastern Anatolia.
  • On May 3, 2006, remote controlled mine injured 11 Turkish soldiers in the Hakkari Province, in the south-east corner of Turkey, located at the juncture of Iraq and Iran.
  • On May 13, 2006, one bomb caused the death of four Turks in the city of Beldeler in the Erzincan Province in the eastern Anatolian region of Turkey.
  • During May 13-15, 2006, the Kurds conducted 13 night attacks in Turkish army camps, with uncertain number of causalities; though one Turkish soldier was killed by a mine in the Hakkari Province. Also, one train was derailment by a PKK bomb during the train route Elazığ – Bingöl.
  • The common Turkish-Iranian operations stopped on May 13, 2006.
  • On May 22, 2006, one non-commissioned officer was killed in Diyarbakır by a mine and one the same day PKK rebels attacked a Jendarma (gendarmerie) station in the Bingöl Province.
  • On May 24, 2006, the Kurdish organization “The Hawks of Kurdistan” bombarded the major international airport in Istanbul, the Atatürk International Airport, located in Yeşilköy, on the European side of the city. The merchandise station of the airport and other facilities were destroyed and the airport closed because the fuel tanks were to explode.
  • On May 25, 2006, a conflagration destroyed a factory in Istanbul, of Turkish military interests, by the use of a bomb by “The Hawks of Kurdistan”.
  • On May 28, 2006, PKK rebels attacked on a Jendarma station outside of Diyarbakır, and they killed one non-commissioned officer, one policeman and three Kurds - “Village Guards” (Kongra Guerillas) who were activated in the area.
  • On May 29, 2006, two Turkish soldiers were killed and two PKK fighters, during a battle between the Turkish army and PKK in Şırnak.
  • On May 30, 2006, five men of the Turkish Special Forces and three “Village Guards” were killed on a PKK ambush in the Kelmehmet mountain region in Şırnak.
  • On June 1, 2006, Turkish artillery forcefully attacked Kurdish villages in N. Iraq causing the death of 13 villagers. The attack was conducted one day after the inspection of the border of N. Iraq by a team of US Army officials, under the command of a General. The US team also visited a Kurdish refugee camp with 260 families whose houses had been destroyed.
  • On June 2, 2006, two PKK rebels were killed in the city Gen.
  • On June 4, 2006, a remote controlled bomb was set off in the port of Mersin wounding 16 Turkish citizens. The attack was conducted by “The Hawks of Kurdistan”.
  • On June 5, 2006, two Turkish soldiers were killed and eight were wounded during a battle between the Turkish Special Forces and PKK rebels near the city of Bingöl. Later two offensive AH-1 Cobra helicopters killed three PKK rebels. One of the AH-1 Cobra helicopters received fire and was forced to land onto a closed motorway.
  • On June 6, 2006, two Turkish soldiers were killed and two were wounded during PKK ambush in Şemdinli. Also, on the same date one mini armored bus carrying Turkish officers exploded by PKK mine in the city of Pülümür in the Tunceli Province in eastern Turkey. The driver of the mini bus was killed.
  • On June 11, 2006, three Turkish soldiers were killed in PKK ambush in the Tunceli Province.
  • On June 12, 2006, two Turkish officers, two Turkish soldiers and two political employees of MİT were killed and five Turkish officers and eight Turkish soldiers were wounded in PKK ambush again in the Tunceli Province. On the same date, in the district of Silvan in Diyarbakır two PKK fighters and one Turkish soldier were killed.
  • On June 14, 2006, two PKK fighters were killed in the Tunceli Province.
  • On June 15, 2006, “The Hawks of Kurdistan” bombarded in the Eminönü district in Istanbul, a bus station, wounding many citizens.
  • On June 16, 2006, PKK bomb in the city of Van destroyed the military weather station of the Turkish army.
  • On June 17, 2006, one powerful PKK bomb caused the derailment of a merchandise train the Muş Province in eastern Turkey. Eight out of 12 carriages were totally destroyed. The bomb exploded through remote control.
  • On June 18, 2006, another three PKK rebels were killed by the Turkish forces in the Tunceli Province. One group of 13 PKK Kurds was attacked by forces in land and by four F-16s and three AH-1 Cobras; 10 out of 13 managed to escape.
  • On June 21, 2006, 11 PKK rebels and four Turkish soldiers were killed on an intense battle near the city of Çukurca in the Hakkari Province. Turkish aircraft and helicopters were added during the battle.
  • On June 25, 2006, in the tourist area of Antalya, located on the Gulf of Antalya on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey, a blast from a bomb caused the death of four and left 25 wounded. PKK assumed responsibility. A meeting was held on the same area by the PM Erdoğan caucus (The Justice and Development Party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP).
  • On July 5, 2006, a PKK bomb destroyed the Government’s party offices (AKP) in the Kartal district of Istanbul.
  • On July 10, 2006, three PKK rebels were killed in Hakkari Province.
  • On July 11, 2006, three PKK rebels were killed in Diyarbakır.
  • On July 12, 2006, one non-commissioned officer, one policeman, and one Turkish soldier were killed during a battle with PKK in the Isikli village of the Çukurca town in Hakkari Province.
  • On July 13, 2006, five Turkish soldiers were killed and four wounded in Bingöl when their vehicle set off a PKK mine.
  • On July 14, 2006, another four Turkish soldiers were killed and four wounded as a result of a mine in Bitlis Province in eastern Turkey.
  • On July 15-16, 2006, seven Turks and two “Village Guards” were killed during an air-landing operation with the use of four AH-1 Cobra helicopters.
  • On July 16, 2006, seven Turks were killed in the Şırnak Province. Also, on Turkish policeman was killed in the Özalp city of Van Province in eastern Turkey. More, on Turkish soldier was killed and one policeman wounded during PKK rebels incursion on a guard house in Bingöl. Also, in Bingöl Province and specifically in Ucieka village one PKK Kurd was killed during the battle.
  • On July 16, 2006, the Turkish Supreme Anti-terrorist Board met unscheduled under the Presidency of Adbullah Gul.
  • On July 17, 2006, the Turkish Cabinet Council met unscheduled with the participations of the Turkish Supreme Anti-terrorist Board, discussing PKK activities. PM Erdoğan announced Turkey’s intension to invade into N. Iraq (southern Kurdistan) provoking an intense reaction from US Ambassador to Turkey Ross Wilson, and from the US Government directly.
  • On July 18, 2006, two PKK Kurds were arrested by Istanbul police while they were preparing bombarding attacks.
  • During July 18 to July 25, 2006, PKK Kurds and Turkish forces combated 18 times, although neither side reported their causalities. Also, during the same period, 40,000 Turkish troops were transferred, and PM Erdoğan spoke about the participation of NATO troops against PKK and he threatened again for invading to N. Iraq, which caused the telephone interference by US Pres. George W. Bush.
  • On July 27, 2006, the secret service of the Jendarma, JITEM, suffered a significant loss. Through remote control, the car of the commander in the Bingöl Province was blown up, killing Maj. Adil Karagöz and his driver. On July 12, 2006, PKK fighters had killed MİT commander of the Batman Province southeast of Turkey.
  • On July 28, 2006, six Turks were seriously wounded in the city of İzmir, located on the Aegean Sea, when one PKK bomb blast outside of the branch office of the Oyak9 bank which belongs to the Turkish Army.
  • On August 4, 2006, the Supreme Military Board combed out 17 officers of the Turkish Army, charging them with participating in Islamic organizations. PM Erdoğan was unhappy and delivered his proviso for this decision. A few days earlier, on July 31, 2006, it was announced abruptly and speedily the assignment of the Turkish Land Forces Commander General Yaşar Büyükanıt as chief of the Turkish General Staff. The promotion of Gen. Büyükanıt was realized through an unorthodox method and outside normal legal procedures. This development aimed to “speak” to the PKK of Turkey’s strong policies because Gen. Büyükanıt is considered to be a tough anti-Kurd. Büyükanıt was the man behind Turkey’s part in the Abdullah Öcalan arrest.
  • On August 4, 2006, the PKK responded to Gen. Büyükanıt with bombardments and incursions in south-east Turkey. In the city of Adana, two bombs wounded 13 people and destroyed one branch office of the Oyak Bank, four police cars and five police officers were wounded. A third blast in Diyarbakır city derailed 15 merchandise baggage cars. Tens police and military stations in south-east Turkey received small-scale attacks and gunshots from PKK rebels after the conclusion of the meeting of the Turkish Supreme Military Board.
  • On August 6, 2006, four Turkish soldiers were killed and five wounded on a PKK ambush in Gümüşhane Province. Also, in Şırnak Province one Turkish officer, 38 years old was killed while his eight year-old son was wounded.
  • On August 14, 2006, “The Haws of Kurdistan” assumed responsibly for the bomb attack in Istanbul, in the tourist area of Sultanahmet that is the heart of historic Old Istanbul, injuring three citizens. The organization announced that the attack was accomplished in “the name of freedom and honor” of the Kurdish population which lived in Turkey.
  • From August 20 to August 23, 2006, 90 forestlands were burned in Turkey in 17 different tourist areas. Some of the fires were left to burn out of control. “The Haws of Kurdistan” assumed responsibility for the fires throughout Turkey.
  • On August 20, 2006, Kurds started a fire in the gas pipeline in northeast Turkey in the Ağrı Province that borders with Iran. The pipeline comes from Iran and, due to the fire, the gas flow stopped.  
  • On August 24, 2006, one Turkish citizen and two soldiers were wounded during the combat between the Turkish patrol and PKK rebels near Bitlis city. In the same area, but in a different incident, one villager was killed and two wounded.
  • Again on August 24, 2006, Turkish F-16 combat aircraft carried out air strikes in the Kanimasi and Snaht regions in N. Iraq causing serious casualties among PKK forces.
The past months of battles against the PKK Kurds by the 265,000-strong Turkish forces in south-east Turkey have not yielded any fruitful results. Also, the common Iranian-Turkish attacks on the Kurds had almost zero results and caused much humanitarian causality. However, it must be noted that in Mount Kadil during the combat with Iranian commandos one important member of PKK was injured. This was Murat Karayılan, considered to be the successor of Abdullah Öcalan. Karayilan fought in the front line and he was injured by the bombs delivered by Iranian aircraft.
On the other hand, PKK was found to be very flexible and had increased its battle strength. From their total attacks, the attack in the Istanbul airport caused damages of million of dollars and the two assassinations of the commanders of JITEM and MİT in the provinces of south-east Turkey were considered to be successful.
US Ambassador in Ankara Ross Wilson stated that “northern Iraq is not Lebanon”. The US supported the resolution of the problem only through the cooperation of the US, Iraq, and Turkey. Turkey, meanwhile, pressures the Iraqi Government to take measures and restrain PKK, requesting immediate results.
A delegation from the Kurdish Democratic Party, a close ally to the US, had visited Ankara on August 4, 2006, and had meetings with the Turkish General Staff, MİT, and Turkish officers. Iraqi Vice-President Dr Barham Saleh had also attended the meetings. However, the meetings were confidential and information was not published. One week prior to the meetings, Kurdish President Jalal Talabani and the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hoshiar Zebari, reassured Ankara that they would restrain PKK.
Turkey also requested that Iraq cease issuing passports for PKK members and Kurdish refugees coming from Turkey, by the Federal Kurdish Government, and they also requested the closure of PKK offices in Iraq and the dismantling of PKK bases on Mount Kadil.
The Turkish General Staff intensively pressures Iraqi Pres. Talabani to deliver Murat Karayılan to Turkey; he was, as of late August 2006, being kept and guarded in a hospital in Arbil. Gen. Büyükanıt himself said that “if you want to cooperate you must deliver Karayilan”. Büyükanıt wants Karayilan as he is considered to be the tough man of PKK and imprison him in the İmralı Island together with A. Öcalan, and he presents him as the leader of the Kurdish organization “The Hawks of Kurdistan”. If the death penalty was delivered to the second in command of A. Öcalan, the climate domestically in Turkey would be discharged because many Turks consider betrayal the fact that A. Öcalan was not executed. Moreover, Gen. Y. Büyükanıt would like to see his legacy showing him to be the man who arrested the leadership of PKK. And it would appear that he was also thinking of his future in politics.
Turkey was expected to deliver a plan which would foresee the return of Kurdish refugees and PKK guerillas to Turkey, and these would be distributed throughout the country, apart from a team of 600 members of PKK; the future of those had not been decided yet even though there is a suggestion to distribute them in northern European countries and would be subsequently denied entrance to Iraq and Turkey. TV and radio stations, newspapers, magazines and Internet media and all media of PKK would be closed in Iraq and the PKK should be recognized as an illegal organization in Iraq. Also, the plan foresaw tough measures against the PKK, though these would be difficult to realize.
Turkish Generals have delivered their plan to the Iraqi Government and they have a time limit; that is until the middle of September 2006. Otherwise, they have threatened to invade into northern Iraq (southern Kurdistan). The PKK has also seen the plan and has rejected it.
Kurdish leader Zubeyir Aydar stated that “the problem will not be resolved on Mount Kadil, but only through political means in Turkey that should give the final solution to the Kurdish problem”.
In the circles of the Turkish military structure it is said that Iraqi Pres. Talabani would deliver Murat Karayilan to Turkey to appease the situation. However, this would provoke confrontations between PKK and Kurdish supporters of Talabani in N. Iraq.
Recently, a close associate of Karayilan was murdered by “unknown” people in N. Iraq. He was a top member of the military structure of PKK and his death created turbulence in the PKK. Members of the PKK considered that Turcomen had murdered their associate in reprisal for the assassinations of the two officers (JITEM and MİT). Others believe that Pres. Talabani’s men killed him because of Pres. Talabani’s negotiations with Turkey to extradite Murat Karayilan to Turkey.
On August 23, 2006, Murat Karayilan offered a conditional ceasefire to Turkey. Karayilan said that “we respond to many requests by the Government of Kurdistan of Iraq and the other Kurdish circles, and responding to the US State Department, we are ready to observe a ceasefire and opt for a peaceful and democratic settlement to the Kurdish issues in Turkey”.  Also, Karayilan said that “we are ready for a ceasefire on September 21 coinciding with World Peace Day. Turkey should be ready to respond and flexible in this regard” he added. “We are aware that Turkey has imperialistic and nationalistic ambitions and want to pressure the Iraqi Kurds in charge. We are not prepared for their attack, but we are ready to defend.”
Secure information has revealed that the Turkish General Staff had developed its own chemical substance which had the code name “citric acid” and they were prepared to use it again PKK in their cave on Mount Kadil.
The trial of Saddam Hussein and of his six associates that started on August 21, 2005, and he is facing charges against the eradication of 100,000 Kurds between 1987 to 1988 using chemical weapons, woke the memories of the PKK Kurds who have stated that they would retaliate very hard against Turkey if they dared to invade into N. Iraq and made use of chemical weapons.
A Turkish invasion of northern Iraq, using chemical weapons, appeared — as of the end of August 2006 — almost certain to be conducted in concert with Iranian military operations against the Kurds. Significantly, these operations could occur under the overall strategic distraction of broader military operations by Iran against Israel, and the diversion operations conducted by further DPRK (North Korean) strategic weapons tests.


Footnotes:
1. General Mehmet Yaşar Büyükanıt, the commander of the Turkish Land Forces recently became the Chief of the Turkish General Staff (as of August 30, 2006), replacing General Hilmi Ozkok.
2. Turkish National Security Council: The present Turkish National Security Council is composed of the prime minister, the chief of the General Staff, the ministers of National Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, and the commanders of the branches of the armed forces and the gendarmerie. This body sets national security policy and coordinates all activities related to mobilization and defense.
3. Muş Province of Turkey or alternative transliteration: Mush.
4. The Voice of Kurdistan, issue no 89, February- June 2006, written in Greek and printed in Athens-Greece, by the member of PKK, Faruk Sarialtin.
5. Turkey ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on May 12, 1997.
6. See, specifically, details of the Australia Group here
7. Location of the FMV Işık Üniversitesi: Büyükdere Cad. 34398 Maslak - İstanbul,
8. Gülhane Askeri Tıp Akademisi – GATA / website here
9. Official web site of the OYAK BANK Here
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